ABSTRACT Behavioral measurements have provided insightful information in many research areas, including insider threats; however, none of the previous research investigated the use of head micromovement patterns while presenting visual stimuli that represent possible malicious intentions to detect insiders' intentions; hence, to detect insider threats. In this paper, we hypothesize that involuntary head micromovement patterns toward visual stimuli allow for detecting intentions of access. Because detecting intentions does not state the probability of an intention to be executed, we hypothesize that the motivation toward an intention is inversely correlated with the number of micromovements. This paper also investigates the potential of substituting the physiological measurements of the intent-based access control (IBAC) model, which is a risk-based access control model that assesses risk based on involuntary physiological signals, electroencephalogram data, with the proposed behavioral measurements and compares the results. We assessed the IBAC model with the proposed behavioral measurement using experiments on 30 participants and it suggests the potential of the proposed behavioral measurement with 100% intention detection accuracy, similar to the physiological measurement results; however, the behavioral measurement showed 100% correctly accepted, but 70% correctly rejected users when compared with the physiological measurement, which showed 100% correctly accepted and rejected users. Further, the behavioral measurement showed 80% user acceptance when compared with the physiological measurement, which showed only 10% user acceptance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although insider threat incidents are low in number, the value associated with each incident may exceed the sum of the value of hundreds of outsider threats, especially because insiders know the valuable assets with a high probability of success when attacking those assets. Recently, an access control system that is specifically designed to prevent insider threats has been proposed [1] . The Intent-based Access Control (IBAC) detects the intentions of access and the motivation that corresponds to that intention as a probability measure. It then calculates a risk value for the system to make a decision to grant or deny an insider, an authorized user, access. The IBAC model relies on physiological signals to detect intentions of access, namely electroencephalogram (EEG) signals; however, even though the system shows promising results, reporting 100% accuracy in detecting intentions of access and 100% accuracy in preventing insider threats incidents in a controlled experiment setting with 30 participants, the physiological signals acquisition only reached 10% user acceptance level due to the nature of the physiological signal acquisition tools.
Problem Statement: Although the IBAC model shows promising results, reporting 100% accuracy in detecting intentions of access, the acceptability of the system only reported 10% acceptance rate due to the nature of the signals that are collected. Therefore, there is a need for a method that improves the acceptability of the IBAC model, namely, method that substitutes the physiological method with a more user-friendly method.
Proposed Solution: In this paper, we investigate the ability to substitute the physiological signal measurement with a behavioral measurement to address the user acceptability. We also hypothesize that head micromovement patterns while presenting visual stimuli that represent possible intentions allow us to detect intentions of access. In addition, we hypothesize that by using head micromovement, we are able to distinguish between low motivation and high motivation based on the number of micromovements.
Contribution: The research work presented in this paper constitutes a contribution to the information technology security field generally, and to the sub-field of access control specifically, by:
1-Providing a design and development of a new method of: a) Authentication that identifies and verifies the intentions of access. b) Authorization that is based on the risk associated with the intentions of access and motivation levels. 2-Providing the design and development for detecting intention of access using micromovement behavior, as well as detecting motivation levels toward intentions of access. 3-Improving the acceptability of the IBAC model by substituting the physiological measurement with a userfriendly behavior measurement. [2] . Insider threats include IT sabotage, fraud, and theft of intellectual property. Insider threats are the most difficult threats experienced, and the mitigation of the impact they pose is not easily done by traditional protocols. Although insider threats have been studied since the early 1980s, the threat has been there since the beginning of humanity [3] . Today, the threat of an insider has evolved and the impact has increased. Best practices are released periodically, such as the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats [4] , which provides the practices and standards that companies need to implement to mitigate the insider threat. Yet still, as per the 2013 State of Cybercrime Survey from PwC and CSO [5] , the survey concludes that companies do not do enough to protect themselves. It states that insiders are more likely to cause damage to an organization than external attacks. 33% of companies who suffered an insider threat did not have an insider threat response plan even though it was suggested as best practice over a decade ago, since 2001 [6] . Companies need an automatic system that detects and prevents the insider threat that does not rely heavily on an overwhelming list of best practices. Automatic solutions to the insider threat include implementing and using security awareness programs, data loss prevention, segregation of duties, honeytokens, and intrusion prevention systems. Those measures are the most used in organizations and the most suggested to be implemented, yet there exist two other measurements that provide a better opportunity for preventing an insider threat: 1) Behavioral analysis and 2) Physiological signals analysis. Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) [7] is an access control system that relies heavily on behavioral and physiological signals to detect a malicious intention in the form of the prevention of precrime. FAST targets terrorism in particular. It requires users to pass through gates and reply to questions while their behavioral and physiological signals are analyzed. Physiological and behavioral signals include thermal imaging, electrocardiogram, respiration, eye movement, and facial expressions. Limitations in the FAST approach include 1) The need for a facility to test. 2) Not an automated approach. 3) Detection is in the form of an interview and therefore detection time is not user-friendly. 4) Low success rates. 5) Low user acceptability.
A. INSIDER THREATS COUNTERMEASURES AND THE ROLE OF ACCESS CONTROL

The Computer Emergency and Response Team (CERT) Insider Threats Center defines insider threats as ''A malicious insider threat is a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems''
Current access control models, including Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Non-Discretionary Access Control, fail to detect and prevent insider threats. DAC models are those such as Capability-based and Access Control List (ACL-based), which involve the decision of the object creator ''Owner'' to determine who can access the object and what level of access is permitted. DAC is an ownerbased access control that works in some deployments well enough but is not a robust choice to address an insider threat. Non-Discretionary Access Control models overcome the weaknesses in DAC models by allowing the access control decisions to be done from the operating system layer. Such a model reduces the human error factor and makes the access control model efficient. Mandatory access control (MAC), such as Rule-based and Lattice-based access control, provide access permissions based on a set of rules that are predefined in the system. The most used access control model by organizations is the Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [8] , which sets permissions to entities based on their roles in the company. Other Non-Discretionary Access Control models have been proposed, such as History-based Access Control (HBAC) [9] , Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) [10] , Policy-based Access Control (PBAC) [11] , . . . to list a few. Most access control systems are static. Once a policy, attribute, role . . . etc. is added and its permissions have been assigned, permissions do not change unless a modification occurs. This imposes a risk of the insider threat as permissions do not get revoked and start to build in a way that they become unmanageable. The literature suggests the use of Non-Discretionary Access Control models as the decision becomes computerized.
However, nowadays, dynamic access control models exist to complement the need for evolving and continuously changing the structure of organizations. This is when Risk-Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC) [12] comes into play. RAdAC is a dynamic risk-based access control model that assesses the risk based on characteristics of people, characteristics of IT components, characteristics of objects, environmental factors, situational factors, and heuristics. Each of the VOLUME 6, 2018 assessment components is a challenge in itself. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) represents the challenge of characteristics of people as ''User Informationthis is the source of any information RAdAC would need to assess the trustworthiness of the people involved in the access decision, such as identification and authentication information, and authorizations such as their security clearance. Because RAdAC will have to render access decisions for people that do not hold security clearances, other information will need to be available to use in the risk determination process to determine a level of risk associated with granting them access. What sort of information might be valuable in determining their trustworthiness? Could a mini background investigation be done online?'' [12] . The IBAC model addresses the RAdAC requirement of human trustworthiness [13] and [14] ; however, the IBAC model relies heavily on physiological signals to detect intentions of access and then assesses the risk of access. The IBAC model shows 100% accuracy in preventing malicious insiders from gaining access to system resources [1] . However, the user acceptability of the current IBAC model reached only 10%, specifically due to the nature of the physiological signal acquisition method, which requires a user to wear a cap that includes 14 EEG sensors, and that the sensors require a saline solution. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate the potential of substituting the physiological measurement with a behavioral measurement to improve the user acceptability. We also test the proposed behavioral approach to determine its ability in detecting intentions of access and prevent insider threats.
B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Various theories and models offer a link between intention and behavior, including the Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), the Expectancy Violation Theory (EVT), and the Signal Detection Theory (SDT) as well as the Fight, Flight, and Freeze Responses.
The IDT explains the process that leads to interpersonal deception and shows the aspects related to the interaction that stimulates it. IDT defines deception as a strategic activity that allows subjects to avoid detection. It influences behavior, movement, and countermovement to change [30] . EVT concerns the nonverbal and verbal behavior cues that allow for detecting the expected behavior and if any violations exist in that behavior as well as the consequences of the violations [20] . It allows for classifying nonverbal cues as to whether they have behavioral anomalies or deviations from a baseline. To detect if a behavior is suspicious or normal, the SDT that was developed by Green and Swets [21] can be used. It defines two sets of probabilities in a signal detection test where two possible stimuli types are differentiated. Further, according to [22] ''Fear can trigger the 'fight or flight' response to raise the heart rate, sharpen the senses and provide access to huge amounts of energy to cope with threats to survival. At times, the threat is so intense it can cause a 'freeze' response. This could be interpreted as the brain being overwhelmed, or it may have evolved as a way of keeping still to hide from predators'' [30] .
The above theories provide the theoretical foundation for intention detecting using micromovements as a behavior measurement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related work is given in Section 2. The hypotheses and objectives are provided in Section 3. The methodology is given and experiment design and data analysis are provided in Section 4. The results are provided and discussed in Section 5. Finally, a prognosis of the future of intention detection for access control is drawn in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Intention detection has been studied in many research areas, including neuroprosthetics [23] , activity support [24] , in the context of human and information security generally [31] - [35] , and in the context of access control specifically [1] , [27] . The area of neuroprosthetics (the field of aiding patients in movement restoration) is a widely studied research area where the intention of movement is detected by analyzing the EEG and electromyogram (EMG) signals [25] , [26] . Activity support approaches targeted intention detection by observation. Nakauchi et al. [27] proposed human behavior detection using embedded sensors in a smart room. Sensors are placed on doors, drawers, chairs, . . . etc. The data collected from these sensors is sent to the main server for analysis. Behaviors were recognized from the external observations by recording the current status of objects, observed events, and the frequency of activities. The system is capable of detecting the behavior of studying, eating, arranging, and resting based on analyzing the sequences of actions. An experiment ran on 10 participants showed an accuracy rate of 93.7% with new system users.
A. OBSERVATIONAL-BASED INTENTION DETECTION FOR ACCESS CONTROL
A relevant research area that targets hostile intent for access control focuses on identifying deception by the analysis of vocal expressions. GK1 is a layered voice analysis (LVA) software, which is produced by Nemesysco and is used for access control systems [28] . The software manufacturer claims that by answering 3-5 questions, intentions can be detected. However, Elkins et al. [29] argued that a deception detection solution that relies only on one cue such as voice lacks the ability to detect voice control capable individuals. The authors state that multiple sensors to collect various information, such as heart rate, pupils' dilation and linguistic content, should be applied to reduce false positives and to eliminate false negatives.
Burgoon et al. [30] proposed an intention detection for hostile actions by using deception detection in communication, verbal and nonverbal. The authors stated that the presence of deception as an internal state will result in deceptive cues that raise suspicion. They map an intention to an internal state that results in a behavior. However, an internal state might result in many behaviors and one behavior might be the result of many internal states, which results in a weakness of the proposed approach. The authors used the IDT to map behavioral cues to profiles. They defined a threshold of suspicion or trust behavioral cues as their detection method. The inferred intent is the result of behavioral cues that elicit arousal level, power, pleasantness, and intensity, and which are compared with general and individual-specific expected behavioral profiles. The approach requires a large database of different profiles for behavior detection for the decision method to be accurate. Any different behavioral approach of a hostile intent will result in a false negative. New hostile actions will then be logged and stored in the database to become a valid detection signature. Because of the use of an observational behaviorbased method, such an approach varies between individuals and any hostile intent holder can fool the system by either mimicking a good intention or approaching the hostile action differently.
Experimentation on real hostile intent situations is a challenge for researchers as it is nearly impossible to mimic realworld scenarios of hostile intent that might cause harm to participants. The experiment design will not be as real as it should be to evaluate the proposed solution. Elkins et al. [29] stated that applying social psychology theory and communication to evoke real emotions, stress, and tension reduces this limitation of experimental design and makes the evaluation of proposed solutions acceptable.
Intention detection plays a role as well in identifying social and terrorist networks [31] - [35] . Vybornova et al. [35] proposed a method for identifying social tension and intention detection on the basis of natural language semantic analysis. The authors used language syntax and semantics with statistical processing to identify social tension. They also used the general laws of natural language, general psychological, psycholinguistic, and sociological rules, and trends as a basis of their method.
B. PHYSIOLOGICAL-BASED INTENTION DETECTION
A related work was performed by [36] that investigated the possibility of detecting agreement vs disagreement intention using the EEG signals with presented sentences before participants stated their intentions. This shows promise in the ability to detect intentions of access by analyzing the EEG signals. The authors reported 80.62% accuracy using the Support Vector Machine classifier on the FC2, FrontalCentral location 2, EEG channel.
Further, the P300-based Concealed Information Test (CIT), formally known as the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), for crime-related details has reported an accuracy rate of correct detection that ranges between 70 and 100% accuracy [37] . From the P300-based CIT perspective of precrime, Meixner and Rosenfeld [38] were able to detect the existence of terrorists' future plans by applying CIT with a proof of the robustness of using P300 to detect the existence of future terrorist plans. The authors ran an experiment on 24 participants divided into two equal groups: one group planning a terrorist attack and another group planning a vacation. The terrorist group was tested on three pieces of concealed information: knowledge of location, method, and time. By stimulating the participants' brains with the text of two categories, 1) Target that represents the location, method, and time of the terrorist attack, and 2) Nontarget that represents general locations, times, and methods, the authors achieved 100% correct classification of terrorists and innocents. The result of the experiment showed that the terrorist group resulted in a P300 peak to those target texts enabling detection of 12/12 of the terrorist group with no false positives out of 24 suspects, 12 of which were innocents. The authors suggest that this protocol has the potential to detect future terrorist activity; however, the approach is not suitable for access control as it requires over 25 minutes of stimuli presenting time. Furthermore, the authors' protocol required subjects to practice for 5 minutes, which is not realistic in real-world scenarios and questions their results. The authors requested subjects to respond to a visual stimulus, which presents a weakness in the approach as the approach requires the cooperation of the subject to detect their intentions.
IBAC [1] was the first system to present an approach for intention detection that targets the source of intention, which is the brain. The Intent Detection component of the IBAC model is based on the involuntary responses toward stimuli that are generated by the brain and are extremely hard to control. The method utilizes the CIT, formally known as the GKT to detect intentions of access. However, due to the nature of the EEG signal acquisition, the user acceptance level only reached 10%. Therefore, in this paper, we propose to substitute the physiological measurement with a user-friendly microbehavioral measurement to address the acceptability of the technology. We also address the two hypotheses that state ''Intentions of access can be detected by analyzing head micromovement patterns when presenting visual stimuli'' and ''The intent corresponding motivation can be detected by analyzing the number of micromovements.''
1) INTENTION-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (IBAC) AND THE MICROMOVEMENT BEHAVIOR
IBAC is a risk-based, rather than an identity-based, access control model that measures risk based on the intention of access and the motivation levels. IBAC works based on three components: 1) Intent and Motivation Detection, 2) Risk Assessment, and 3) Access Decision. The IBAC components are described in more detail in the following:
a: Intention and Motivation Detection (IMD)
The Intention and Motivation Detection (IMD) component receives input from noninvasive sensors that are attached to the user's head. Once signals are obtained, they are filtered, classified, and analyzed to detect the intention and the level of that intention (motivation level).
IMD returns the intention category that is detected from a set of possible intentions. Each intent category is assigned a value that influences the overall risk. The intent category VOLUME 6, 2018 value assignment depends on the resources that the system is protecting and, as such, assigning the impact value of an intent is the organization's decision. IMD also returns the motivation level that corresponds to the likelihood of an intent being executed. The proposed measurement for detecting Intention and Motivation in this paper is the micromovement behavior instead of the EEG signals.
Risk is defined as the probability of a threat exploiting a vulnerability in an asset. Three components exist in the definition of risk: threat, vulnerability, and asset. In this paper, the threat and vulnerability always exist. The threat is the insider threat and the vulnerability is the abuse of privileges causing damage to assets [1] .
The RA component provides an assessment of risk levels associated with the type of intention to exploit a vulnerability in an asset and the motivation level (Probability) with regard to the value of the asset that is protected. The RA component calculates a risk level and then passes the results to the Access Decision component [1] .
Once an intention is detected, the intention category cost value that corresponds to the detected intention is assigned in the Intent Category (IntC), which is provided by the asset owner.
Because intentions are highly driven by the motivation level that accompanies the tested intention [15] , [16] , the motivation level, which is a factor that influences an individual to commit an intended action, is used to determine the probability of an intention being executed. Therefore, the Intention Motivation (IntM) value is assigned to the IntM, The IntM value is determined by the number of micromovements; the lower the number of movements, the higher the motivation toward an intention.
Intention Motivation
The number of micromovements is divided by 10 as the Intent Motivation functions as a probability of an intent being executed and its value is between 0 and 1. The number of micromovements is the difference between the number of micromovements when a user views stimuli that represent their intention and the number of micromovements when a user views stimuli that do not represent their intention. The number of micromovements when viewing stimuli that do not represent a user's intention serves as a baseline for the detected intention. The difference in the number of micromovements is divided by 10 and then reported as the IntM. Previously, the IntM value was determined by the physiological signal amplitude, which is computed as follows [1] :
where P300 is an EEG signal that occurs 300 ms after a user recognizes their intention when presented with a visual stimulus.
Risk Assessment theory [17] - [19] states that risk is equal to Loss × Probability of occurrence. The following equation calculates the total risk level as defined by risk assessment theory, which states that risk is equal to the impact multiplied by the probability of impact. Because the impact in the insider threat context is the intention and the probability of the impact is the motivation level toward the intention, the risk value is calculated as follows [1] :
Risk (R) is the total risk and is defined as:
Motivation levels are assigned values between 0 and 1. The intention category value is assigned values between 0 and 100. The motivation levels are detected by the number of micromovements, and the intent category is detected by the Intention Detection component. In contrast, the intent category value is determined by the asset owner.
After calculating the total risk of a specific intention toward a particular asset with a specific motivation, we provide an access decision based on the overall risk.
However, basing the access decision on overall risk alone is misleading, as a low percentage risk may result in a wrong access decision unless the asset value is also taken into consideration. Therefore, the risk assessment component assesses risk as follows [1] :
The Total Estimated Loss is the value provided to the decision-making component to decide whether to deny or to permit access to protected assets. The value of the total estimated loss is in the form of dollars for making betterinformed decisions from higher management and/or the asset owner.
c: Access Decision (AD)
The Access Decision (AD) component maps the Risk Assessment output to a decision about whether to grant or deny access to an asset. AD bases the decision on the estimated loss of value in an asset and the threshold of accepted value loss in an asset. The decision is to be determined by the organization deploying the system to deny or allow access. The organization will also determine levels of access, report incidents, raise flags, and/or monitor users [1] . Table 1 summarizes related work in the intention detection area showing the utilize classifiers and the accuracy of each method as well as comments on each proposed method.
III. HYPOTHESES AND OBJECTIVES
A. MAIN HYPOTHESIS
The head micromovement behavior measurement may substitute the physiological measurement in the IBAC model with a higher user acceptance level.
To test the main hypothesis, two hypotheses are developed: 
B. INTENTION HYPOTHESIS
Intentions of access can be detected by analyzing head micromovement patterns when presenting visual stimuli. An intention is defined as making an explicit conscious decision to perform an action. Intentions are deliberate, and forming one is an automatic process unless it is revised. An intention leads an agent to perform the action directly. Intentions have stability; once formed, an intention has a tendency to persist [39] . Further, when individuals are presented with visual stimuli that represent their concealed intention, the stimuli trigger surprise and fear. The surprise and fear result in paying more attention to the visual stimuli and result in the Fight, Flight, and Freeze Responses. Furthermore, in [40] , Seltzer discusses the freeze response and the paralyzing human experiences due to the delay in response because of the decision-making of fight or flight. Therefore, we hypothesize that when a user is presented with a set of possible intentions, the pattern of head micromovement would be distinguishable when comparing stimuli that represent the current user's intention from stimuli that do not represent the current user's intention. Precisely, the number of micromovements when presenting the user's current intention would suddenly decrease due to the freeze response when compared with the number of micromovements when presenting nonrelated intentions.
However, knowledge of an intention is not essential that it is going to be executed, so we hypothesize that:
C. MOTIVATION HYPOTHESIS
The lower the number of micromovements when compared with current normal head micromovements, the higher the motivation toward that intention is.
People usually act normally and continually move at the microlevel, yet we hypothesize that when they are shown their intended secret action, the micromovements change in number.
To address the hypotheses, we developed the following quantitative research objectives:
Obj.1 To test the ability to substitute the physiological measurement of the IBAC model with head micromovement pattern behavioral measurement. Objective 1 addresses the main hypothesis of this paper. Obj.2 To detect intentions of access when analyzing head micromovement. Objective 2 addresses the intention hypothesis. Obj. 3 To detect the likelihood of an intention to be executed. Objective 3 is performed by detecting the motivation level using head micromovement patterns. Objectives 2 and 3 deliver the intention category and the probability of execution and serve as the two inputs to calculate the risk level. Obj. 4 To compare the accuracy level of the IBAC model when using the physiological measurement and when using the microbehavioral measurement. Objective 4 is achieved by comparing the results of the IBAC model that was reported in [1] with the current results of the IBAC model. Obj.5 To compare the user acceptance level of the IBAC model when using the physiological measurement and when using the microbehavioral measurement. Objective 5 is achieved by comparing the user acceptance results of the IBAC model with the current results of this paper.
IV. METHODOLOGY, EXPERIMENT DESIGN, AND DATA ANALYSIS
The proposed methodology to address the research objectives merely depends on the nature of the study. Because the research problem is, in fact, human-related (the insider threat), human experimentation is then the selected method.
A. EXPERIMENT
Design and Data Analysis.
B. EXPERIMENT GOAL
The aim of the experiment is to formulate an extrinsic intention, an intention with low motivation, and an intrinsic intention, an intention with high motivation, to address the hypotheses and test the ability to substitute the IBAC model's physiological measurement with a microbehavioral measurement. VOLUME 6, 2018
C. SUBJECTS
A group of 40 participants, both male and female, aged between 18 and 40 years participated in the experiment. To simulate the normal usage of real-life deployment of the system, we ensured that all participants were capable of participating in the experiment regardless of the use of any medication prior to the signal acquisition. All electronic devices were put away to ensure that the signals are not affected by external sources and all subjects participated voluntarily with no offers.
D. PROCEDURE
The participants were divided into two groups. Group 1 (G1) of 20 participants with an extrinsic intention, an intention we impose on them to have (hesitation-based), and Group 2 (G2) of 20 participants, 10 participants' data were not usable and noisy due to sneezing/coughing and device malfunctioning, with an intrinsic intention, an intention they choose to have (motivation-based).
The context of the experiment is to deny a person access to a resource if she has projected any specific malicious intentions about the use of that resource. For G1, we have chosen the action of access to a physical resource (lab). Only having good intentions of access such as to study or meet someone should result in granting access. Having the malicious intention of burning a lab should result in access being denied.
Participants in the experiment were asked to have on their mind the malicious intention of burning a lab while looking at random images that they have never seen before. We then started showing various pictures to the participants, including pictures where the lab is set on fire and record the head micromovements while showing the images. A marker is sent when each image starts to show and ends for the analysis. We then looked to see whether the burning lab pictures resulted in a lower number of head micromovements, which would indicate a recognition of their malicious intention toward that space. If the number of head micromovements stays near the baseline during the showing of images of a person studying or meeting someone in the lab, it means a participant has good intentions of access that should result in access request being granted.
For G2: each participant was informed that an important email was sent to all students by the academic advisor requesting updating their information a while ago to streamline the registration of course processes for the next semester, and in an hour the system stops accepting any responses, which would result in problems in their registration. Participants were told that this requires a wired access to the network to be able to update their information, and we are willing to provide them access to our personal system only if they do not access a folder named ''Personal.'' The Personal folder contains private pictures, bank username and password information, government critical information, and diary. Participants were shown the folders and were told not to access any of the files for us to provide them with the laptop to update their information. Participants were asked to aim for one file to open securely and read or view its content when we provide them with the laptop without telling us which one they have opened even after the experiment is done. Once they aimed for a folder, we started the experiment.
To know what file a participant has opened, we use HyperCam [41] , which records what a participant does while using the laptop. The main reason for asking participants not to tell about the file they have in mind and that they opened is to address the psychological aspect of committing a wrongful act and that they need to hide it, which simulates a real scenario.
E. PROCEDURE DISCUSSION
For G1, participants were placed in a scenario to have a malicious intent (burning a lab) that they do not want to do but are requested to have an intention to do. This is an extrinsic intention and is accompanied by hesitation and should result in a lower number of head micromovements than the baseline. For G2, participants were placed in a scenario in which they can be granted legitimate access to a computer. This setup simulates a real-life scenario of an employee getting access to a data repository. By asking the participants not to open the Personal folder, we simulate a forbidden activity although they are able to perform this action. This serves as the abuse of privilege we encounter in the insider threat. By stating what files exist in the Personal folder, we provide participants with details of what they can do and to what files.
This also simulates a real insider threat scenario as insiders know the valuable information in an organization. Finally, by informing participants that if they open one of the private files and get caught, we stop the experiment and they fail, and we simulate what actions an employee is informed not to do while signing their employment contract and what consequences they may encounter if they do perform such a breach.
F. TEST ENVIRONMENT
To measure the head micromovements, we used the gyro sensor that is embedded in the Emotiv EPOC which is a small MEMS chip with a full-scale range of 500 • /s on each axis. The MEMS chip is a two-axis rotational accelerometer that measures the acceleration on each axis over the duration of each sample, which is 128 times per second. While the utilized sensor is mounted on the head, the test could be carried out by measuring the head micromovements remotely using a laser or a camera that is highly sensitive to movement.
Participants completed the experiment using a custom system developed to deploy the test and gather the responses from the participants. Participants are first introduced to EPOC before being fitted with one. Then the setup is tested (for about 1 minute) to ensure that there is a strong signal. The micromovement data are collected at two times during the experiment: during the baseline and during presenting stimuli. The baseline and reading of stimuli session is timed to record precisely for one minute. Each participant session is recorded as follows:
In a quiet environment, first, participants read the instructions of the experiment, which state that they are asked to think of burning a lab for G1 and access a personal file for G2. Then the baseline is recorded for one minute. During the baseline phase, participants were asked to relax and are shown a black screen. It was ensured that there was no reflection on the screen. After that, 64 image-based stimuli flash, 16 stimuli from a target category, which are images that reflect the user's intention, and 48 stimuli from a nontarget category. For G1 images, stimuli are random pictures of fire, burning papers, and burning books in the target category, and random university campus, labs, and students in the nontarget category. For G2, image stimuli are pictures of the existing files in the Personal folder. Each image lasts for 1 second for a session that lasts for 64 seconds, where no delay between stimuli is used. The pattern of flashed stimuli is three images from a nontarget category and then one image from a target category. Each stimulus flashes only once during the session. Target/ Nontarget-based markers are automatically sent to Testbench, the Emotiv EEG collection system, for analysis. Event markers are sent using the PortWriter program, which sends commands from a COM port to another. The com0com program is used to create and map two virtual COM ports together.
G. DATA ANALYSIS
Afterward, raw data were exported from Testbench and converted from the European Data Format (EDF) to raw CSV files.
For the head micromovement analysis, only CSV file columns number 34 as the X-axes, 35 as the Y-axes, and 36 as the event marker data are extracted. Columns 34 and 35 are divided into two categories based on column 36, intended or nonintended action, and then imported to MAT-LAB. The remaining 1-33 columns were not used as they include the EEG data. Figure 1 depicts the algorithm for the IBAC model incorporating the micromovement-based intention detection.
Several patterns are used to calculate the number of micromovements. The comparison is done between X-axes in both categories, Y-axes in both categories, X-axes, and Y-axes in both categories. Patterns are applied to all participants to select the best method.
Pattern 1: is to compare no movements in X-axes and no movement in Y-axes. The event category that shows a lower number of head micromovements than the baseline is then chosen to be the correspondence of the intended action.
V. RESULTS
In this section, the results of the experiment are provided addressing objectives 1 through 5. The detection of intention using the head micromovement, Objective 2, is provided. In addition, the detection of motivation level using the head micromovement, Objective 3, is addressed. Further, a comparison between the physiological-based measure and the behavior measure is discussed, objective 4 and the acceptability level of the behavior measure is provided. Finally, the results of objectives 2, 3, 4, and 5 address the ability to substitute the physiological measure with the behavior measure, objective 1.
Objective 2: Head Micromovement as an Intention Detection Measure
Intentions are driven by intrinsic and/or extrinsic agents where an intention of an action becomes a future plan and where a plan is near, a matter of seconds, or far, a matter of days or weeks.
Because intentions are mainly future plans and because an individual possesses knowledge about their intention, we hypothesize that it is possible to exploit the selfknowledge existence about an intention before an intention VOLUME 6, 2018 is executed by analyzing the involuntarily head micromovements.
The involuntarily micromovements are the very small movements that occur when viewing stimuli that represent the intended action compared with general nontarget stimuli in one-thousandth of a second. We hypothesize that when an entity views stimuli that represent its intention, the number of micromovements becomes lower as attention becomes higher as per the recognition background information that state that attention level becomes higher when recognition of a stimulus occurs.
When the number of movements becomes lower, the likelihood of an intention being executed becomes higher; therefore, the number of micromovements after applying the filter, the number of movements, indicates the motivation toward that intention. Because individuals continuously move, there exists a microshifting in space in all directions. Some movements are the results of physiological characteristics such as heart beating, berating, yawning, talking, eating to list a few. Other micromovements are the result of behavioral characteristics such as nodding, agreeing, rejecting, reacting to emotional feelings, and recognizing objects. We exploit the behavioral characteristics of micromovements in the context of viewing or listening to a target vs nontarget stimuli when recognizing an intention to detect that intention.
We test several patterns to calculate the number of micromovements. The comparison is done between X-axes in both categories, target and nontarget, Y-axes in both categories, X-axes, and Y-axes in both categories. Patterns are applied to all participants to select the best method. After testing all patterns, the only shared discriminative pattern of the two categories of stimuli was pattern 5 in the Y-axes, which states a micromovement of Up-Down-Down-Up is less frequent in the target category and more frequent in the nontarget category. All other patterns were not significant. The analysis of each category was taken for the first 4 seconds in each category to simulate a real-life scenario of authentication time. This results in 512 variations of movements in each category. Figure 2 depicts the X-axes and Y-axes micromovement without applying a filter when viewing intended vs nonintended actions that are represented in visual stimuli. It shows that the participant was focusing on the screen and not voluntarily moving their head as the most movement was nine steps movement in the Y-axes for the whole session while each movement is done in 1.28 ms. Figure 3 depicts the X-axes and Y-axes movement after applying the pattern 5, Up-Down-Down-Up, which reduces the number of steps to six steps only and shows a lower number of movements when viewing the intended action vs when viewing the nonintended action.
The gyro sensor, which is a small MEMS chip with fullscale range of 500 • /s on each axis, records 128 micromovements per second, therefore there is no significant or slight movement because a significant movement is represented by a number of micromovements, a number of slight movements, With a significant movement to UP for one second, the pattern would be UP for 128 times. Therefore, the threshold for the pattern to determine the direction of movement is each recorded movement that is 128 recorded micromovements per second. In this case, no pattern can be similar to another and we would be able to differentiate between the patterns easily.
Further, the number of movements does not only allow detection of the motivation toward an intention but also allows detection of what the intended action is by showing lower micromovements when compared with the rest of the tested possible intentions.
After knowing the intention a user has, we refer to the assigned risk value of that intention. The value assignment is performed by the asset owner, who gives a value for threats, malicious intentions.
The data are then applied to equation 2 [1] with the motivation level as the number of micromovements when viewing the tested intention divided by 10 because motivation level is treated as the probability of an intention being executed and the intent category value as 90% for testing purposes. R = (Motivation level * Intention category value) 100 (2) The results of the 30 participants' micromovements reactions are shown in Figure 4 , which illustrates the higher number of pattern movement in normal nontarget stimuli reaction compared with the target stimuli reaction. A two-tailed paired samples for means t-test shows that the number of occurrences of the pattern (Up-Down-Down-Up) of head micromovements when viewing Target stimuli (M = 1.9, SD = 1.15) compared with the number of head occurrences of micromovements when viewing Nontarget stimuli (M = 3.83, SD = 1.46, p ≤ .0001). Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) also suggests a difference between the Target and Nontarget micromovements between the two groups with p < 0.0001.
The statistics support objective 2 and the Intention Hypothesis, which states ''Intentions of access can be detected by analyzing head micromovement patterns when presenting visual stimuli'' and suggests that there exist a low number of head micromovements when viewing target stimuli that represent the intended action compared with nontarget stimuli that do not represent the intended action in 30 participants. 100% of the intentions were correctly detected using the micromovement behavior and specifically when applying the pattern 5 filter.
Objective 3: Motivation Level Detection using Head Micromovements.
It has been shown that the P300 amplitude determines the motivation levels in the IBAC model and differentiates between the G1 and G2 participants with 100% accuracy level [1] . In this paper, we hypothesize that ''The lower the number of micromovements when compared with current normal head micromovements, the higher the motivation toward that intention is.'' Participants 1-20 were from G1 with an experimental design to elicit an extrinsic intention (hesitation-based) with low motivation while participants 21-30 were from G2 with an experimental design to elicit an intrinsic intention (motivation-based) with high motivation. After analyzing the data from the sensors to differentiate between the two groups' motivation levels we discover the following:
A two-tailed paired samples for means t-test shows that the number of occurrences of the pattern (Up-Down-Down-Up) of head micromovements when viewing Target stimuli in the G1, hesitation-based, (M = 0.15, SD = 0.05) compared with the number of head occurrences of micromovements when viewing Target stimuli in G2, Motivation-based (M = 0.28, SD = 0.12, p ≤ .0001). ANOVA also suggests a difference between the micromovements between the two groups with p < 0.0001.
The statistics support objective 3 and Motivation Hypothesis, which states ''The lower the number of micromovements when compared with current normal head micromovements, the higher the motivation toward that intention is'' and suggests that there exist a lower number of head micromovements between the hesitation-based group, G1 and the motivation-based group, G2, when viewing target stimuli that represent the intended action. The total risk in the physiological-based IBAC model suggests a value of 90% in the intent category and the value of the signal amplitude as the motivation levels to compute the total risk. The paper [1] showed a 100% accuracy level of preventing insiders from gaining access to protected resources. In this paper, we aimed for the same result and therefore the intent category is 90% and the motivation levels are calculated as the difference of micromovements when viewing Target (intended action) stimuli and Nontarget (nonintended action) stimuli. Figure 5 depicts the risk level between G1 and G2.
A two-tailed paired samples for means t-test shows that the risk level of G1 when viewing Target stimuli (M = 0.15, SD = 0.05) compared with the risk level of G2 when viewing Target stimuli (M = 0.28, SD = 0.12), p ≤ .0001. ANOVA also suggests a difference between the risk level in G1 and the risk level in G2 with p < 0.0001.
If the risk level is to be set at 25% as a threshold, the system results in 30% falsely accepted, 100% correctly accepted, 0% falsely rejected, and 70% correctly rejected users.
Objective 5: The Acceptability Level of the Head Micromovement Measure.
A survey was given to the 30 participants after completing the experiment that included a question on whether they accept the technology to be deployed where they may work. 24 participants out of 30 selected accept, an 80% acceptance level, which showed a higher acceptability level than the physiological-based IBAC model, which only showed 10% acceptability level. The acceptability results of a behavioral approach were expected to be higher than the physiological approach due to the privacy implications that biometricrelated technologies usually face, especially when comparing a behavioral approach with an EEG-based approach, which reveals sensitive and private information, such as bank card numbers, area of living, and passwords [42] . Therefore, the acceptability usually is very low when compared with behavioral methods such as gait, way of walking, voice . . . etc. When comparing the analysis of EEG signals with the analysis of movements, natural acceptability gets a higher rate; however, in this paper we investigate if we substitute the VOLUME 6, 2018 physiological measurement with a behavioral measurement that has a higher acceptability level whether the micromovement behavioral measurement is a valid approach to detecting intentions of access and preventing insider threats.
Objective 1: Substituting the Physiological Measure in the IBAC Model with the Head Micromovements Measure.
After achieving objectives 2, 3, 4, and 5, the statistics support objective 1 and the main hypothesis, which states ''The head micromovement behavior measurement may substitute the physiological measurement in the IBAC model with a higher user acceptance level'' and suggests that the head micromovement measurement may substitute the existing physiological measurement with 70% accuracy of rejecting malicious insiders' access to restricted resources but with 80% acceptance rate compared with the current physiological-based IBAC model, which reached 100% accuracy of rejecting malicious insiders access to restricted resources but with only 10% acceptance level. Table 2 summarizes the experiment results in comparison with the physiological-based IBAC.
While the behavioral-based method showed 70% accuracy, it could be used as phase 1 to select suspicious individuals from the crowd and then phase 2, the physiological-based IBAC, is to be applied on each suspicious individual to verify the intentions with a higher accuracy.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated the potential for substituting the physiological measurement in the IBAC model, which showed 100% accuracy of rejecting malicious insiders but with only 10% acceptance rate, with a head micromovement measurement that showed 70% accuracy of rejecting malicious insiders with 80% acceptance rate.
The statistics and results supported the hypotheses in this paper and contributed a behavioral measurement that showed a potential in denying malicious insiders from gaining access to restricted resources. This work presented a behavioral measurement that was performed by collecting data from a sensor placed on the participants' head.
Future work may involve the collection of micromovement data from a remote camera, while a user is presented with the visual stimuli to assess the risk of access. Future work may also evaluate the system in real-life settings with largescale participation to evaluate the accuracy and acceptability of the system. A noise detection algorithm that detects if a movement is voluntary or involuntary is also required to be implemented to prevent attacking the system by trying to mimic a normal behavior. Future work may further discuss how to increase the accuracy level from 70% to a higher level, possibly a different pattern can be used, utilizing learningbased approaches to learn the patterns and/or introducing another sensor with better accuracy.
